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Abstract
Differential privacy provides a rigorous framework for privacy-preserving data anal-
ysis. This paper proposes the first differentially private procedure for controlling the
false discovery rate (FDR) in multiple hypothesis testing. Inspired by the Benjamini-
Hochberg procedure (BHq), our approach is to first repeatedly add noise to the log-
arithms of the p-values to ensure differential privacy and to select an approximately
smallest p-value serving as a promising candidate at each iteration; the selected p-
values are further supplied to the BHq and our private procedure releases only the
rejected ones.
Apart from the privacy considerations, we develop a new technique that is based
on a backward submartingale for proving FDR control of a broad class of multiple
testing procedures, including our private procedure, and both the BHq step-up and
step-down procedures. As a novel aspect, the proof works for arbitrary dependence
between the true null and false null test statistics, while FDR control is maintained
up to a small multiplicative factor. This theoretical guarantee is the first in the FDR
literature to explain the empirical validity of the BHq procedure in three simulation
studies.
Keywords. Differential privacy, Report Noisy Max, false discovery rate, Benjamini–
Hochberg procedure, positive regression dependence on subset, submartingale
1 Introduction
With the growing availability of large-scale datasets, decision-making in healthcare, infor-
mation technology, and government agencies is increasingly driven by data analyses. This
data-driven paradigm, however, comes with great risk if the databases contain sensitive
information of individuals such as health records or financial data. Without appropriate
adjustments, statistical analysis applied to these databases can lead to privacy violation.
For example, Homer et al. demonstrate that, under certain conditions, it is possible to
determine whether an individual with a known genotype is in a genome-wide association
study (GWAS) even when only minor allele frequencies are revealed [36]. Such privacy
issues have serious implications: at best, individuals and agencies are discouraged from
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sharing their data for research purposes due to the concern of privacy leakage, imped-
ing scientific progress [40]; at worst, potential adversaries could make use of sensitive
information to jeopardize the social foundations of liberal democracy [63].
Being able to conduct data analysis in a way that preserves privacy, therefore, is key
to removing barriers to scientific research while preventing breaches of personal data. In
this paper, we offer the first privacy-preserving multiple testing procedure. The problem
of multiple testing arises in many privacy-sensitive applications such as a GWAS, where
a large number of single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) are tested simultaneously for
an association with a disease and the hope is to control some error rate for the significant
SNPs. Perhaps the most popular error rate is the false discovery rate (FDR), which,
roughly speaking, is the expected fraction of erroneously rejected hypotheses among all
rejected hypotheses.
We use differential privacy to measure privacy loss of our multiple testing procedure
(Definition 2.1). First introduced by Dwork et al. [23], this definition of privacy is tailored
to statistical data analysis. The goal in a differentially private algorithm is to hide the
presence or absence of any individual or small group of individuals, the intuition being
that an adversary unable to tell whether or not a given individual is even a member of
the database surely cannot glean information specific to this individual. In computer
science, considerable efforts have been made to develop private data release mechanisms
[23, 47, 3] and private machine learning algorithms under differential privacy constraints,
for example, boosting [34], empirical risk minimization [15], private PAC learning [7],
and deep learning [1]. On the statistical front, differential privacy has been added to and
incorporated into many statistical methods in areas of robust statistics [22], nonparametric
density estimation [62], hypothesis testing [60, 28], finite-sample confidence intervals [39],
functional data analysis [33], network data analysis [38], and linear regression [42, 61].
A second major contribution of the paper is to prove FDR control of this procedure
and beyond. Formally, the FDR is defined as
FDR := E
[
V
max{R, 1}
]
,
where R denotes the number of rejections (discoveries) made by a procedure and V the
number of true null hypotheses that are falsely rejected (false discoveries). This notion
of type I error rate was introduced in the seminal work of Benjamini and Hochberg [8],
along with the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure (BHq) that controls the FDR under certain
conditions (Algorithm 1). Our procedure, referred to as PrivateBHq henceforth and with
details given in Algorithm 5, is derived by recognizing the iterative nature of the BHq
procedure and making each iteration differentially private. Unfortunately, all existing
proof strategies for FDR control are invalid for PrivateBHq.
Thus, a new technique for proving FDR control is needed. To this end, we
1. Develop a novel proof of FDR control for a class of multiple testing procedures,
including the original (non-private) BHq and many of its variants – a proof requiring
different assumptions than those found in the vast literature on this topic – and
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2. Relate the FDR control and power properties of PrivateBHq to the corresponding
properties of the non-private version.
PrivateBHq provides unconditional end-to-end privacy. Now, regarding p-values as
functions of a dataset, our proof of the FDR and power properties of PrivateBHq requires
that the underlying, non-private, p-value functions satisfy a certain technical condition,
specifically, Definition 2.5 with sufficiently small parameters. All computations satisfy
the definition for some choice of these parameters, but not all choices of parameters yield
meaningful results when we enforce privacy. Popular examples of p-values satisfying the
condition are described in Section 2.
The outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. The next two subsections
elucidate the two contributions, namely developing PrivateBHq and proving FDR control
for a class of procedures, and the following subsection consolidates privacy and inferential
properties together for PrivateBHq. To make this paper self-contained, in Section 2 we
give a brief introduction to differential privacy, followed by the complete development of
the PrivateBHq procedure. Section 3 is devoted to establishing FDR control of a broad
class of multiple testing procedures and, as an application, Section 4 proves FDR control
of PrivateBHq and argues its power as well. Next, we present three simulation studies
in Section 5 to show the effectiveness of our new FDR control result applied to the BHq.
The paper is concluded by a discussion in Section 6.
Algorithm 1 BHq Step-Up Procedure
Input: nominal level 0 < q < 1 and p-values p1, . . . , pm
Output: a set of rejected hypotheses
1: sort the p-values in increasing order: p(1) ≤ p(2) ≤ · · · ≤ p(m)
2: for j = m to 1 do
3: if p(j) > qj/m then
4: continue
5: else
6: reject p(1), . . . , p(j) and halt
7: end if
8: end for
1.1 Making BHq private
The original BHq is our starting point in developing the PrivateBHq procedure. The origi-
nal procedure is non-private because the data of a single individual can affect the p-values
of all hypotheses simultaneously, possibly changing the outcome of the BHq procedure
dramatically.
To make the BHq private, for now we need two facts about differential privacy: (1)
differential privacy is closed under composition, permitting us to bound the cumulative
privacy loss over multiple differentially private computations. This allows us to build
complex differentially private algorithms from simple differentially private primitives, and
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(2) we will make use of the well-known Report Noisy Max (respectively, Report Noisy
Min) primitive [24], in which appropriately distributed fresh random noise is added to the
result of each computation, and the index of the computation yielding the maximum (re-
spectively, minimum) noisy value is returned. By returning only one index the procedure
allows us to pay an accuracy price for a single rather than all computations1.
A natural approach to obtaining a private version of BHq is by repeated use of Re-
port Noisy Max: Starting with j = m and decreasing: use Report Noisy Max to find
the (approximately) largest p-value; estimate that p-value and, if the estimate is above
a certain more conservative critical value than qj/m, accept the corresponding null hy-
pothesis, remove it from consideration, and repeat. Once a hypothesis is found with its
p-value below the threshold, reject all the remaining hypotheses. The principal difficulty
with this approach is that every iteration of the algorithm incurs a privacy loss, which
can be mitigated only by increasing the magnitude of the noise used by Report Noisy
Max. Since each iteration corresponds to the acceptance of a null hypothesis, this step-up
procedure is paying in privacy precisely for all null hypotheses accepted, which are by
definition not the “interesting” ones. Moreover, recognizing that most null hypotheses in
a typical GWAS would be accepted, it is fundamentally difficult to preserve information
content while protecting individual privacy by emulating the step-up procedure.
Instead of starting with the largest p-value and considering the values in decreasing
order, another approach is to start with the smallest p-value and consider the values
in increasing order, rejecting hypotheses one by one until we find a p-value above some
threshold. This widely studied variant is called the BHq step-down procedure, in contrast
to the aforementioned BHq step-up procedure. Their definitions reveal that the step-down
procedure shall be more conservative than its step-up counterpart. This variant, however,
can assume less stringent critical values than the BHq critical values while still offering
FDR control, often allowing more discoveries than the step-up counterpart [29]. Moreover,
[2] demonstrates the two procedures are asymptotically equivalent for Gaussian normal
means estimation over a range of sparse signals.
Algorithm 2 BHq Step-Down Procedure
Input: nominal level 0 < q < 1 and p-values p1, . . . , pm
Output: a set of rejected hypotheses
1: sort the p-values in increasing order: p(1) ≤ p(2) ≤ · · · ≤ p(m)
2: for j = 1 to m do
3: if p(j) ≤ qj/m then
4: reject p(j)
5: else
6: halt
7: end if
8: end for
1The variance of the noise distribution depends on the maximum amount that any single datum can
(additively) change the outcome of a computation and the inverse of the privacy price one is willing to
pay.
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If we make the natural modifications to the step-down procedure using Report Noisy
Min, also known as the Private Min (Algorithm 3), instead of Report Noisy Max, then
we pay a privacy cost only for nulls rejected in favor of the corresponding alternative
hypotheses, which by definition are the “interesting” ones. Since the driving application
of BHq is to select promising directions for future investigation that have a decent chance
of panning out, we can view its outcome as advice for allocating resources. Thus, a
procedure that finds a relatively small number of high-quality hypotheses, still achieving
FDR control, may be as useful as a procedure that finds a much larger set.
1.2 A new technique for proving FDR control
While various techniques have been developed in the literature for proving FDR control,
they are not applicable to privacy-preserving procedures. Any privacy-preserving pro-
cedure is necessarily randomized. Consequently, the jth most significant noisy p-value
may not necessarily correspond to the jth most significant true p-value. Even worse, Pri-
vateBHq may compare a noisy p-value to a critical value with a different rank and, as
an inevitable result, a larger p-value may be rejected while a smaller p-value is accepted.
This is in stark contrast to the (non-private) BHq and most of its variants, which reject
p-values that are contiguous in sorted order.
These facts about the PrivateBHq procedure destroy some crucial properties for prov-
ing FDR control in existing approaches. For example, it is not clear how to adapt the
elegant martingale technique for FDR control, proposed by Storey, Taylor and Siegmund
[58] (see [49, 35, 50] for extensions of this martingale argument). In essence, this approach
is to construct an empirical process indexed by a threshold under which a p-value is re-
jected. In the case of PrivateBHq, unfortunately, no such threshold exists for singling out
p-values for declaring significance. Another technique that appears frequently in the FDR
control literature (see, for example, [10, 54, 27, 51, 13, 35]) is based on a crucial property of
BHq: provided that a p-value is rejected, the effective threshold for declaring significance
is completely determined by the remaining p-values. Unfortunately, this property is not
satisfied by PrivateBHq either.
To pursue a new strategy for PrivateBHq, we observe that, although PrivateBHq
might skip some of the minimum p-values, nevertheless it preserves a key property with
high probability: if R rejections are made, the largest rejected p-value is roughly upper
bounded by qR/m. This motivates us to give the following definition.
Definition 1.1. Given any cutoffs 0 < q1 ≤ q2 ≤ · · · ≤ qm, a multiple testing procedure
is said to be compliant with {qj}mj=1, if all rejected p-values are always bounded above by
qR, where R is the number of rejections.
In the case of no rejections (R = 0), as a convention, the (non-existent) rejected p-
value is considered to be bounded above by qR. Compliance is an instance of a more
general condition termed self-consistency [11], which further allows a procedure to incor-
porate prior information about each hypothesis into the cutoffs. Using the BHq critical
values {qj/m} as the cutoffs (referred to as BHq-compliance henceforth), however, our
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condition is sufficiently general to cover many classical multiple testing procedures, in-
cluding both the step-down and step-up procedures, the generalized step-up-step-down
procedures [59, 52] and particularly the PrivateBHq procedure. The compliance condition
is solely determined by the number of rejected p-values and the size of the largest one,
without requiring that each rejected p-value be below its associated critical value. As a
consequence, this condition permits skipping the smallest p-values and this is well-suited
for differentially private procedures. As an aside, it is generally easy to identify whether
a given procedure satisfies this condition or not.
As a surprising finding of this work, FDR control is simply a consequence of BHq-
compliance together with the independence with the null condition (Definition 1.2). As
such, our finding offers more than expected, applying to far more examples than Pri-
vateBHq. In detail, we consider a generalized FDR [53, 55] defined as
FDRk := E
[
V
R
;V ≥ k
]
,
which reduces to the usual FDR if the positive integer k is set to 1. The present paper
focuses on the case of k ≥ 2. In other words, this slightly relaxed FDR permits no more
than k − 1 false discoveries without any penalty, trading off for more power improvement
while still maintaining a meaningful interpretation of the rejected hypotheses. The differ-
ence between the original FDR and FDRk becomes negligible if the number of discoveries
R is large.
Definition 1.2. A set of m test statistics are said to satisfy a condition referred to as
independence within the null, or IWN for short, if the true null test statistics are jointly
independent.
With the two preparatory definitions in place, we offer the following theorem. Let m0
denote the number of true null hypotheses and pi0 := m0/m be the true null proportion.
Theorem 1. If the test statistics obey the IWN condition, then any procedure that is
compliant with the BHq critical values {qj/m}mj=1 must satisfy
FDRk ≤ Ckpi0q (1.1)
for every k ≥ 2, where Ck is a universal constant.
We immediately obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1.3. If the test statistics obey the IWN condition, both the BHq step-up and
step-down procedures satisfy (1.1) for k ≥ 2.
This bound involves an additional factor Ck, compared with the usual bound pi0q in
the FDR literature. Explicitly, letting {ξj}∞j=1 be i. i. d. exponential random variables with
mean 1, the constant is given as
Ck = E
[
max
j≥k
j
ξ1 + · · ·+ ξj
]
. (1.2)
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For example, C2 ≈ 2.41, C3 ≈ 1.85, C10 ≈ 1.32, and Ck tends to 1 as k →∞. In particular,
C1 defined in (1.2) is infinite, and this is exactly why Theorem 1 does not apply to the
usual FDR.
Theorem 1 is optimal for all k ≥ 2 as we show next.
Theorem 2. Given any C < Ck, if q is sufficiently small and m is sufficiently large, then
there exists a BHq-compliant procedure applied to a set of IWN p-values such that
FDRk > Cq.
In the literature, existing FDR-controlling procedures often assume independence be-
tween the true null and false null test statistics (see [8, 9]) or certain sophisticated corre-
lation structures between these two sets of test statistics, such as the positive regression
dependent on subset (PRDS) property [10, 41, 56] (see also [52, 12]). Roughly speak-
ing, the PRDS property holds if the test statistics exhibit certain positive dependence
on each true null test statistic. In particular, the dependence between true and false
nulls cannot be arbitrary. For the sake of completeness, we emphasize that the literature
has considered a few cases for FDR control with an arbitrary correlation between the
two sets of test statistics [10, 11], but, unfortunately, the associated procedures are often
extremely conservative. As a well-known example, Benjamini and Yekutieli show in The-
orem 1.3 of [10] that the BHq procedure gives FDR control using critical values at level
q/(1 + 12 + · · · + 1m) ≈ q/(logm + 0.577) in place of q. In fact, BHq with this log-factor
correction could be even more conservative than the Bonferroni method [45].
In contrast, Theorem 1 makes no assumptions regarding the dependence between the
true nulls and false nulls, while still controlling the FDR up to a small multiplicative factor.
As such, Theorem 1 is a contribution of independent interest to the vast FDR literature.
Notably, the dependence can even be “adversarial” in the sense that the false null p-values
can even be constructed as arbitrary functions of the true null p-values. This provides
positive evidence toward understanding the robustness of the BHq procedure observed
in a wide range of theoretical and empirical studies [57, 30, 16]. To be precise, while
existing theoretical work certifying FDR control of the BHq procedure needs to impose
specific distributional assumptions on the p-values, this procedure is empirically observed
to yield valid FDR control with a much larger class of correlation structures, and it is
even challenging to construct numerical examples where the BHq fails to control the FDR
[32, 31]. Following this point of view, Theorem 1 can be thought of as establishing the
robustness of the BHq against arbitrary dependence between the true null test statistics
and the false nulls.
1.3 Back to PrivateBHq
Consolidating pieces of Sections 1.1 and 1.2, we aim for a procedure that has the fol-
lowing three properties simultaneously: differential privacy, provable FDR control, and
appreciable detection power. As noted earlier, PrivateBHq provides differential privacy
unconditionally. To argue the remaining two properties one needs to consider the careful
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way in which privacy-preserving noise is added to p-values and take into account the mul-
tiplicative sensitivity of the p-value computation, a measure of how much the p-value can
change between adjacent databases (see Definition 2.5 in Section 2.2). Roughly speaking,
we say a p-value is η-multiplicatively sensitive for some η ≥ 0 if for any two adjacent
databases (that is, databases differing in a single element) D and D′, the p-values com-
puted on them are within a multiplicative factor of eη of each other, unless they are
exceedingly small (captured by a second parameter, ν). As shown in Section 2.2 by exam-
ples, many standard statistical tests have p-values that are O(n−0.5+o(1))-multiplicatively
sensitive (recall that n denotes the number of individuals in the database).
Let m′ denote the maximum number of significant hypotheses reported by PrivateBHq
and let ε ≥ 0 be the privacy parameter (see Definition 2.1). Informally, if η√m′/ε is small,
then the PrivateBHq procedure achieves the following properties:
(a) It is differentially private, unconditionally.
(b) It controls the FDR at level q + o(1) whenever all the p-value functions are (η, ν)-
sensitive for a sufficiently small value of η.
(c) With high probability, it makes at least as many discoveries as the BHq step-down
procedure truncated at m′ with nominal level (1 − o(1))q whenever all the p-value
functions satisfy (η, ν)-sensitivity for sufficiently small η and ν.
These three claims will be made explicit in Theorems 3, 5, and 6, respectively.
2 The PrivateBHq Procedure
In this section, we first introduce the differential privacy machinery at a minimal level and
then focus on developing the PrivateBHq procedure.
2.1 Preliminaries on differential privacy
A database D = (d1, d2, . . . , dn) ∈ X n consists of n data items (for example, health records
of n individuals), where X is a sample universe. Data items need not be independent (for
example, health records of siblings). Two databases D,D′ = (d′1, d′2, . . . , d′n) are said to be
neighbors, or adjacent, if they differ only in one data item. That is, there is exactly one j
such that dj 6= d′j . A (randomized) mechanism M is an algorithm that takes a database
as input and releases some (randomized) response of interest. We denote by range(M)
the collection of all possible outputs of the mechanismM. In the context of genome-wide
association studies, a database D records genotypes of individuals, and M, for example,
is a mechanism that releases the minor allele frequency of a SNP plus some random noise.
Differential privacy, now sometimes called pure differential privacy, was defined and
first constructed in [23]. The relaxation defined next is sometimes referred to as approxi-
mate differential privacy.
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Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [23, 21]). A (randomized) mechanism M is (ε, δ)-
differentially private for some nonnegative ε, δ if for all adjacent databases D,D′ and for
any event S ⊂ range(M),
P(M(D) ∈ S) ≤ eε P(M(D′) ∈ S) + δ.
Pure differential privacy is the special case where δ = 0. In the definition above,
both databases D,D′ are fixed and the probabilities are taken over the randomness of the
mechanism M. The parameters ε and δ measure the desired privacy protection. With
small ε and δ, this definition states that the likelihood of the released response is indifferent
to changing a single individual in the database, thus leaking little indication of whether a
particular individual is in the database even if all the other individuals are known. This
provides strong privacy protection for each individual in and outside the database.
To report a statistic f = f(D) in a differentially private manner, any mechanism is
necessarily randomized. As its name suggests, the Laplace mechanism does so by per-
turbing f with noise generated from the Laplace distribution Lap(λ), whose probability
density is exp(−|x|/λ)/(2λ). The scale λ > 0 should be calibrated to the sensitivity of
the statistic f , defined as follows.
Definition 2.2. Let f be a real or vector valued function that takes as input a database.
The sensitivity of f , denoted as ∆f , is the maximum of ‖f(D)−f(D′)‖1 over all adjacent
D,D′, where ‖ · ‖1 denotes the `1 norm.
Formally, for any function f that maps databases to Rr for some positive integer r, we
have the following result.
Lemma 2.3 (Laplace Mechanism [23]). The Laplace mechanism ML that outputs
ML(D; f) = f(D) + (Z1, . . . , Zr)
preserves (ε, 0)-differential privacy, where Zj are i. i. d. draws from Lap(∆f/ε).
A simple algorithm that integrates the Laplace mechanism is the Private Min, which
is better known as the Report Noisy Min in the literature [24] and will be the building
block of PrivateBHq, introduced in Section 2.3. Consider a collection of scalar functions
f1, . . . , fm. The Private Min adds Laplace noise to each fj and then reports the smallest
noisy count (with fresh noise added) and its index. A formal description of Private Min
is given in Algorithm 3. The following lemma concerns its privacy property.
Lemma 2.4. The Private Min, as detailed in Algorithm 3, is (ε, 0)-differentially private.
A peek at the proof of this well known lemma, which for completeness appears in
the appendix, reveals that reporting each of j? and fj?(D) + Z is (ε/2, 0)-differentially
private, hence leading to a total privacy loss of (ε/2, 0) + (ε/2, 0) = (ε, 0). Here we
have used the simple fact that differential privacy loss adds up under the composition of
sequential mechanisms, that is, the union of the outputs of a sequence of mechanisms that
each preserve (εj , δj)-differential privacy is (
∑
εj ,
∑
δj)-differentially private [23]. As an
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Algorithm 3 Private Min (Report Noisy Min)
Input: database D, functions f1, . . . , fm each with sensitivity at most ∆, and privacy
parameter ε
Output: index j? and approximation to fj?(D)
1: for j = 1 to m do
2: set f˜j = fj(D) + Zj , where Zj is independently sampled from Lap(2∆/ε)
3: end for
4: return j? = argmin
j
f˜j and fj?(D) + Z, where Z is a fresh draw from Lap(2∆/ε)
aside, the Advanced Composition Theorem [25] (see Lemma 2.9 in Section 2.4), provides
a much tighter bound on this privacy degradation.
Looking ahead, and omitting some technicalities, PrivateBHq will operate on differ-
entially private approximations to the logarithms of p-values, returned by multiple in-
vocations of Private Min. Since differential privacy is closed under post-processing, any
subsequent computation on these differentially privately obtained vlaues can never increase
privacy loss. Thus, PrivateBHq is indeed differentially private, for all p-value functions. Its
statistical properties will depend on the kinds of p-value computations that are performed,
which we turn to next.
2.2 Multiplicative sensitivity of p-values
Multiple testing procedures ubiquitously act on a set of p-values that are computed by
functions that operate on databases. A p-value in our context is frequently referred to
as the function on databases for computing the p-value instead of its numerical value, in
contrast with the vast statistical literature that often does not distinguish between the
function that maps a database to a p-value and the result of the mapping.
We now consider making p-value computations private as the first step toward devel-
oping a private multiple testing procedure. In many important p-value computations (see
Example 2.6), a larger p-value is affected more in magnitude by the change of a single
data item than a smaller p-value. As a result, directly adding noise to the p-values may
overprotect privacy and completely overwhelm signals in small p-values. This would in-
evitably lead to significant detection power loss as the smallest p-values are more likely to
correspond to promising hypotheses.
Our solution will be to (very carefully) work with the logarithms of the p-values. This
strategy is motivated by the observation that, although the (additive) sensitivity of a
p-value may vary greatly, oftentimes the relative change (that is, the ratio) of a p-value
on two neighboring databases is very stable, regardless of the magnitude of the p-value,
unless it is extremely small. In light of this observation, the sensitivity of a p-value, that
is, the worst-case change due to the replacement of an individual in the database, is best
measured multiplicatively. Below, η and ν are nonnegative.
Definition 2.5 (Multiplicative Sensitivity). A p-value function p is said to be (η, ν)-
multiplicatively sensitive, or (η, ν)-sensitive for short, if for all adjacent databases D and
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D′, either both p(D), p(D′) ≤ ν or
e−ηp(D) ≤ p(D′) ≤ eηp(D).
The parameter ν is introduced in recognition of the fact that a very small p-value may
jump or fall by a relatively large multiplicative factor between adjacent databases. This
parameter is normally much less than the Bonferroni level, resulting in essentially no power
loss for truncating p-values at ν. A p-value can satisfy different pairs of (η, ν)-multiplicative
sensitivities. In short, the two parameters η and ν exhibit a certain trade-off relationship
in the sense that one can increase (resp. decrease) η and decrease (resp. increase) ν in a
careful way such that a p-value still satisfies this condition. Every p-value satisfies (η, ν)-
sensitivity for some values of the parameters. Moreover, given p-value functions p1, p2
with multiplicative sensitivities (η1, ν1) and (η2, ν2) respectively, it is immediate that both
functions satisfy (max{η1, η2},max{ν1, ν2})-sensitivity, so given a collection of p-values
there always exist η, ν so that all of the p-values in the collection are (η, ν)-sensitive.
Our PrivateBHq algorithm will make explicit use of both parameters in ensuring pri-
vacy.
Given an (η, ν)-sensitivity p-value function p and a database D, we work with the
logarithmic mapping
pi(D; p, ν) = log max{ν, p(D)}
This statistic satisfies pi(D)− η ≤ pi(D′) ≤ pi(D) + η for all neighboring databases D,D′.
In other words, pi has an additive sensitivity bounded by η. Hence, Lemma 2.2 ensures
that adding Laplace noise Lap(η/ε) to pi(D) preserves (ε, 0)-differential privacy.
We will see below via examples that two large and important classes of p-value com-
putations are (η, ν)-sensitive for some small η and ν, with rigorous proofs given in the
appendix; as a consequence of this, preserving privacy for these p-values only requires a
small amount of noise, leading to negligible accuracy loss. Recall that m denotes the total
number of hypotheses.
Example 2.6 (Binomial Distribution). Suppose the n individuals in D are, respectively,
associated with n i. i. d. Bernoulli variables ξ1, . . . , ξn, each of which takes the value 1 with
probability α and the value 0 otherwise. Let T denote the sum. A p-value for testing
H0 : α ≤ 12 against the alternative H1 : α > 12 is given as
p(D) =
n∑
i=t
1
2n
(
n
i
)
,
where t is the realization of T on the database D. Denote by t′ the counterpart of t on
a neighboring database D′. Without loss of generality, assume t′ = t + 1. The difference
between the two p-values, |p(D) − p′(D)| = 12n
(
n
t
)
, attains its maximum at t = bn/2c or
b(n + 1)/2c (bxc denotes the greatest integer that is less than or equal to x) and decays
rapidly as t deviates from n/2. This implies that additive sensitivity is not a good measure
of the variability of this p-value construction.
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Instead, we fix a (very) small ν and denote by η the maximum of log p(D)p(D′) subject
to the constraint p(D′) ≥ ν. The p-value by definition is (η, ν)-sensitive. To evaluate η,
observe that the log-likelihood ratio
log
p(D)
p(D′)
= log
∑n
i=t
1
2n
(
n
i
)∑n
i=t+1
1
2n
(
n
i
) = log [1 + (nt)∑n
i=t+1
(
n
i
)] ≤ (nt)∑n
i=t+1
(
n
i
) .
In the appendix, it is shown that
(
n
t
)
/
∑n
i=t+1
(
n
i
)
.
√
logn
n under the constraint p(D
′) ≥
m−1−c for any small constant c > 0 if m ≤ poly(n) (that is, m grows at most polynomially
in n) as n→∞. Therefore, we can set ν = m−1−c and η 
√
logn
n . Note that this choice
of ν is much below the Bonferroni level q/m.
Example 2.7 (Truncated Exponential Distribution). Let ζ1, . . . , ζn be i. i. d. random vari-
ables sampled from the density
λe−λx
1− e−Aλ · 1(0 ≤ x ≤ A)
for positive A and λ, an exponential distribution truncated at A. Denote by T = ζ1+ · · ·+
ζn the sum (T is a sufficient statistic for λ). To test H0 : λ = 1 against the alternative
H1 : λ > 1, we consider the p-value
p(D) = Pλ=1(T ≥ t),
where t is the realization of T (note that the value t differs at most by A between ad-
jacent databases). With the same notations as in Example 2.6, this p-value is (η, ν)-
multiplicatively sensitive with ν = m−1−c and η 
√
logn
n for any small constant c > 0.
We remark that (η, ν)-sensitivity is a worst-case guarantee on the sensitivity of a p-
value function. Only the interpretation of the p-value requires the i.i.d. assumption.
As seen in both examples, the parameter η vanishes roughly at the rate O(n−1/2),
implying that less noise is required for privacy protection as the sample size becomes larger.
This appealing feature is impossible without the restriction p ≥ ν for some appropriate
choice of ν. Specifically, in the absence of this constraint, or equivalently by setting ν = 0,
we shall have η = n + 1 in the first example and η = ∞ in the second, requiring a
vast or even an infinite amount of multiplicative noise for preserving privacy. This would
completely dilute any signal of interest. To be complete, we note that not all p-value
computations necessarily lead to vanishing η and ν as n → ∞. An example from [60] is
elaborated in detail in the appendix.
2.3 Developing PrivateBHq
The PrivateBHq procedure (Algorithm 5) is the the sequential composition of Algorithm 4,
which we refer to as the peeling mechanism, denoted peeling, and BHq. In a little
12
more detail, given (non-private) p-value functions p1, . . . , pm and a prescribed number of
invocations m′ ≤ m, PrivateBHq first applies Private Min m′ times to the logarithms of the
p-values, “peeling off” and removing from further consideration the approximately smallest
element with each new invocation of Private Min. These m′ pre-selected hypotheses are
thought of as promising hypotheses. In particular, the number m′ as an upper bound on
the total number of discoveries shall be much less than m. This recognizes that, in many
application scenarios, much fewer are truly significant in an ocean of mediocre hypotheses.
During the peeling procedure, in order to keep track of indices within the original
set, peeling removes a function from further consideration by redefining it to be +∞,
ensuring that it will not be returned by future invocations of the Private Min. The Laplace
noise scale λ shall be chosen to adjust for the privacy protection target, factoring in the
multiplicative sensitivities of p1, . . . , pm and the number of invocations m
′.
Algorithm 4 Peeling Mechanism peeling
Input: database D, functions f1, . . . , fm, number of invocations m
′, and Laplace noise
scale λ
Output: indices i1, . . . , im′ and approximations to fi1(D), . . . , fim′ (D)
1: for j = 1 to m′ do
2: let (ij , f˜ij (D)) be returned by Private Min applied to (D, f1, . . . , fm) with Laplace
noise scale λ
3: set fij ≡ +∞
4: end for
5: return the m′-tuple {(i1, f˜i1), . . . , (im′ , f˜im′ )}
With m′ hypotheses yielded by peeling in place, PrivateBHq supplies quantities in
logarithmic scale instead of, in the conventional setting, the m′ raw p-values and critical
values to the (step-up) BHq procedure. This difference however does not affect the way
BHq proceeds. To be concrete, BHq first orders the noisy values p˜ii1 , . . . , p˜iim′ as p˜i(i1) ≤
· · · ≤ p˜i(im′ ), and then rejects any corresponding hypotheses if p˜iij is below max{γj :
p˜i(ij) ≤ γj}, with the convention that max ∅ = −∞. As we will see in Section 4, the
cutoffs γ1, . . . , γm′ are chosen specifically to ensure FDR control of PrivateBHq; roughly
speaking, γj is slightly below the logarithm of the corresponding BHq critical value qj/m,
where the gap between the two accounts for the multiplicative sensitivity of the p-values
and the uncertainty brought by the Laplace mechanism.
2.4 Preserving privacy
The proof that PrivateBHq is differentially private relies on the fact that the algorithm
only accesses the data through the values returned by peeling. Thus, intuitively, the
final results reported by BHq shall release no more privacy than the intermediate results
yielded by peeling. This intuition is indeed true, that is, differential privacy is closed
under post-processing, as shown by the following lemma.
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Algorithm 5 The PrivateBHq Procedure
Input: database D, parameters ε, δ, η, ν, (η, ν)-multiplicatively sensitive p-value functions
p1, . . . , pm, number of invocations m
′, Laplace noise scale λ = λ(ε, δ, η,m′) , and cutoffs
γ1 < · · · < γm′
Output: a set of up to m′ rejected hypotheses
1: set pij = log max{ν, pj(D)} for 1 ≤ j ≤ m
2: obtain (i1, p˜ii1), . . . , (im′ , p˜iim′ ) by applying peeling to pi1, . . . , pim with noise scale λ
3: apply (step-up) BHq to p˜ii1 , . . . , p˜iim′ with cutoffs γ1, . . . , γm′
4: return the indices of rejected hypotheses
Lemma 2.8 ([21, 62]). Let M be an (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanism and g be any
(measurable) function. Then g(M) also preserves (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
This lemma implicitly assumes the range of the mechanismM falls into the domain of
g. In our context, taking g to be step-up BHq, Lemma 2.8 shows that it suffices to establish
the differential privacy property of peeling. By construction, each pij has sensitivity no
more than η. Lemma 2.4 then immediately ensures that the Private Min, which is invoked
sequentially m′ times in PrivateBHq, guarantees on its own (2η/λ, 0)-differential privacy.
Making use of the fact that, at worst “(ε, δ)’s add up” (see the discussion right below
Lemma 2.4), one can conclude that the peeling mechanism is (2m′η/λ, 0)-differentially
private. Equivalently, to achieve (ε, 0)-differential privacy for peeling, and therefore also
for PrivateBHq, we can set the Laplace noise scale to be λ = 2m′η/ε. In this way, the
noise level grows linearly with m′.
Surprisingly, we can trade a little bit of δ for a significant improvement on ε, as shown
by the lemma below.
Lemma 2.9 (Advanced Composition [25]). For all ε, δ ≥ 0 and δ′ > 0, running l mech-
anisms sequentially that are each (ε, δ)-differentially private preserves (ε
√
2l log(1/δ′) +
lε(eε − 1), lδ + δ′)-differential privacy.
This lemma holds no matter how each mechanism adaptively depends on information
released by prior mechanisms. Taking δ = 0 in Lemma 2.9, we easily obtain the main
theorem of this section, with its proof deferred to the appendix. This theorem shows
adding Laplace noise with scale of order roughly O(
√
m′) is sufficient for protecting privacy
of PrivateBHq.
Theorem 3. Let η, ν be chosen so that all the p-value functions input to PrivateBHq are
(η, ν)-sensitive. Given ε ≤ 0.5, δ ≤ 0.1 and m′ ≥ 10, PrivateBHq with Laplace noise scale
λ = η
√
10m′ log(1/δ)/ε, or larger, is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
3 Proving FDR Control Using a Submartingale
The main purpose of this section is to prove Theorem 1. The proof strategy contains
two novel elements: an upper bound on FDRk involving only true null p-values (Equation
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(3.1) below) and a backward submartingale that allows us to use a martingale maximal
inequality. In addition, this section attempts to obtain the optimal constant Ck for The-
orem 1 in Section 3.2, where we give some intuition behind Theorem 2, and considers a
new variant of the FDR in Section 3.3.
Throughout the section, we focus on an arbitrary BHq-compliant procedure. That is,
any p-value rejected by the procedure is not greater than qR/m, where R denotes the
total number of rejections.
3.1 Controlling FDRk
The proof presented in this subsection highlights its simplicity rather than optimizes the
constant Ck in Theorem 1. The following upper bound on the FDPk for k ≥ 2 of the
BHq-compliant procedure serves as the basis for our analysis:
FDPk ≤ max
k≤j≤m0
qj
mp0(j)
. (3.1)
Above, p0(1) ≤ p0(2) ≤ · · · ≤ p0(m0) are the order statistics of the m0 true null p-values.
Denote by V the number of false rejections. If V ≤ k − 1, (3.1) holds since FDPk = 0.
Otherwise, the largest rejected true null p-value is at least p0(V ) and, therefore, one must
have p0(V ) ≤ qR/m due to the compliance condition. As a consequence, we get
FDPk =
V
R
≤ V
mp0(V )/q
≤ max
k≤j≤m0
qj
mp0(j)
. (3.2)
The IWN condition imposed in Theorem 1 ensures the joint independence of the true null
p-values, each of which is stochastically larger than or equal to U(0, 1). Thus, the ordered
true null p-values can be replaced by the order statistics U(1) ≤ U(2) ≤ · · · ≤ U(m0) of
m0 i. i. d. uniform random variables on (0, 1), while (3.2) remains true in the expectation
sense (recall that pi0 = m0/m):
FDRk ≤ E
[
max
k≤j≤m0
qj
mU(j)
]
= qpi0 E
[
max
k≤j≤m0
j
m0U(j)
]
.
Therefore, Theorem 1 follows from the lemma below.
Lemma 3.1. Let U(1) ≤ · · · ≤ U(n) denote the order statistics of n i. i. d. uniform variables
on (0, 1). There exists an absolute constant ck such that
E
[
max
k≤j≤n
j
nU(j)
]
≤ ck
for n ≥ k ≥ 2.
The proof of this lemma starts by recognizing a well-known representation in law for
uniform order statistics:
(U(1), . . . , U(n))
d
=
(
T1
Tn+1
, . . . ,
Tn
Tn+1
)
, (3.3)
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where Tj = ξ1 + · · · + ξj and ξ1, . . . , ξn+1 are i. i. d. exponential random variables with
mean 1. Writing
Wj =
jTn+1
Tj
,
Lemma 3.1 is equivalent to showing
E
[
max
k≤j≤n
Wj
n
]
≤ ck. (3.4)
Intuitively, the maximum is likely to be attained at some small index j as Wj/n is close
to 1 for a large value of j, due to the law of large numbers. This intuition can be indeed
made rigorous by the fact that W1, . . . ,Wn+1 is a backward submartingale, as shown by
the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. With respect to the filtration Fj := σ(Tj , Tj+1, . . . , Tn+1) for j = 1, . . . , n+1,
the stochastic process W1, . . . ,Wn+1 is a backward submartingale. That is,
E(Wj |Fj+1) ≥Wj+1
for j = 1, . . . , n.
The proof of Lemma 3.2 is deferred to the appendix. Next, we apply this lemma to
prove (3.4) (hence Lemma 3.1 follows immediately) using the following martingale maximal
inequality (for a proof, see pages 71–73 of [48]).
Lemma 3.3 (`1 Martingale Maximal Inequality). Let X1, . . . , Xn be a (forward) sub-
martingale. Then,
E
(
max
1≤j≤n
Xj
)
≤ e
e − 1 [1 + E (Xn logXn;Xn ≥ 1)] .
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Since Lemma 3.2 asserts that Wj/n is a backward submartingale,
Lemma 3.3 concludes
E
(
max
k≤j≤n
Wj
n
)
≤ e
e − 1
[
1 + E
(
Wk
n
log
Wk
n
;
Wk
n
≥ 1
)]
=
e
e − 1
[
1 + E
(
k
nU(k)
log
k
nU(k)
;
k
nU(k)
≥ 1
)]
.
To complete the proof, it suffices to show that for a fixed k the expectation above involving
k/(nU(k)) is uniformly bounded for all n ≥ k. To this end, observe that U(k) is distributed
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as Beta(k, n+ 1− k), and this allows us to evaluate the expectation as
E
(
k
nU(k)
log
k
nU(k)
;
k
nU(k)
≥ 1
)
=
∫ k
n
0
xk−1(1− x)n−k
B(k, n+ 1− k)
k
nx
log
k
nx
dx
≤
∫ k
n
0
xk−1
B(k, n+ 1− k)
k
nx
log
k
nx
dx
=
1
nkB(k, n+ 1− k)
∫ k
0
kyk−2 log
k
y
dy
=
1
nkB(k, n+ 1− k) ·
kk
(k − 1)2 .
To obtain an upper bound that is independent of n, it suffices to show that nkB(k, n+1−k)
has a lower bound depending only on k. Indeed, this is the case:
nkB(k, n+ 1− k) = nkΓ(k)Γ(n+ 1− k)
Γ(n+ 1)
=
nk(k − 1)!
n(n− 1) · · · (n− k + 1)
≥ (k − 1)!.
3.2 Optimizing the bounds
The constant Ck in Theorem 1 matters from a practical perspective. This section is aimed
at finding the optimal constants for all k ≥ 2. Compared with what has been performed
in Section 3.1, this improvement is based on a delicate property about the expectation in
(3.4), as detailed by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4. Define
C
(n)
k = E
[
max
k≤j≤n
j
nU(j)
]
for n ≥ k ≥ 2, where U(j)’s are the order statistics of n i. i. d. uniform variables on (0, 1).
Then,
C
(n)
k ≤ C(n+1)k .
The monotonicity in Lemma 3.4 reveals that the optimal Ck in (3.4) is given as (recall
that Tj is defined in (3.3))
Ck := lim
n→∞C
(n)
k = limn→∞E
[
max
k≤j≤n
jTn+1
nTj
]
. (3.5)
To be complete, we provide a sketch proof of Theorem 2 by constructing a BHq-compliant
procedure and a set of p-values satisfying the IWN condition to show the optimality of
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Ck, with details deferred to the appendix. Explicitly, let the true null p-values be m0
i. i. d. uniform variables U1, . . . , Um0 between 0 and 1, and let all the m − m0 false null
p-values be 0. Denote by j? the index k ≤ j ≤ m0 that maximizes j/U(j). The BHq-
compliant procedure rejects the j? smallest true null p-values and any max{dmU(j?)/qe −
j?, 0} of the false null p-values (dxe denotes the least integer that is greater than or equal
to x), which by construction are all 0. Taking q sufficiently small and both m and m−m0
sufficiently large, FDPk ≈ qj?/(mU(j?)) with high probability. Consequently, we get
FDRk ≈ E
[
qj?
mU(j?)
]
= E
[
max
k≤j≤m0
j
m0U(j)
]
pi0q = C
(m0)
k pi0q,
which tends to Ckq by taking m0 →∞ and m0/m→ 1.
For the moment, suppose the limit can be taken under the expectation in (3.5). As
such, the optimal constant for FDRk is
Ck = E
[
lim
n→∞ maxk≤j≤n
jTn+1
nTj
]
= E
[
max
k≤j<∞
j
Tj
]
, (3.6)
where the last equality results from applying the strong law of large numbers to Tn/n.
Recognizing that the integrable random variable maxk≤j<∞ j/Tj decreases to 1 almost
surely as k increases to infinity, Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem readily asserts
that Ck = 1 + ok(1), where ok(1) denotes a sequence of numbers tending to 0 as k →∞.
This is formally stated in the proposition below, where we consider a sequence of multiple
testing problems indexed by l such that both ml, kl →∞ as l→∞.
Proposition 3.5. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, as k →∞, we have
FDRk ≤ (1 + ok(1))q.
To make the derivation of the optimal Ck above rigorous, we must validate (3.6). In
fact, the Vitali convergence theorem together with the following lemma ensures that the
limit limn→∞ and expectation E can be interchanged.
Lemma 3.6. For a fixed k ≥ 2, the sequence of random variables
max
k≤j≤n
jTn+1
nTj
are uniformly integrable for n ≥ k.
While the proof of Lemma 3.6 is deferred to the appendix, the proof of Lemma 3.4 is
given below.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Denote by U(1) ≤ · · · ≤ U(n) ≤ U(n+1) the order statistics of n + 1
i. i. d. uniform random variables on (0, 1). Then, U(1)/U(n+1) ≤ · · · ≤ U(n)/U(n+1) are
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distributed the same as the order statistics of n i. i. d. uniform random variables on (0, 1)
and, moreover, are independent of U(n+1). Making use of this fact, we get
C
(n+1)
k = E
[
max
k≤j≤n+1
j
(n+ 1)U(j)
]
≥ E
[
max
k≤j≤n
j
(n+ 1)U(j)
]
= E
[
n
(n+ 1)U(n+1)
· max
k≤j≤n
j
nU(j)/U(n+1)
]
= E
[
n
(n+ 1)U(n+1)
]
E
[
max
k≤j≤n
j
nU(j)/U(n+1)
]
= E
[
n
(n+ 1)U(n+1)
]
C
(n)
k .
Since the density of U(n+1) is (n+ 1)x
n for 0 < x < 1, we readily see that
E
[
n
(n+ 1)U(n+1)
]
= 1.
This completes the last step in certifying C
(n+1)
k ≥ C(n)k .
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
5 10 15 20 25
k
Figure 1: Monte Carlo simulated values of Ck using (3.6). The solid line indicates the
maximum of j/Tj over k ≤ j ≤ 105, averaged over 104 runs. The (tiny) shaded band
illustrates the 99%-coverage confidence interval for each k using normal approximation.
Now, we turn to numerically evaluate Ck using the expression (3.6). Although the
distribution of each j/Tj is amenable, less is the maximum of j/Tj over j. In view of this
difficulty, we resort to Monte Carlo simulations, and Figure 1 presents the results that
are averaged over 104 independent replicates. For instance, C2 ≈ 2.41, C3 ≈ 1.85, C4 ≈
1.65, C5 ≈ 1.54, and C25 ≈ 1.18. In passing, we remark that the estimated values of Ck
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as a function of k are fairly accurate as indicated by the uniformly short widths of the
confidence intervals for all k.
3.3 Controlling FDRk
We consider a variant of the FDR defined as
FDRk := E
[
V
R
;R ≥ k
]
,
which includes the usual FDR as an example by taking k = 1. This relaxed FDR differs
insignificantly from the usual FDR if a large number of discoveries are expected, which
is often the case in modern multiple testing applications such as genome-wide association
studies.
In the rest, we aim to prove Theorem 4, a counterpart of Theorem 1 for the FDRk. A
similarity between the two theorems lies in that their proofs both make use of martingale
arguments. That being said, the bound on the FDRk in Theorem 1 cannot carry over to
the FDRk because FDRk ≤ FDRk.
Theorem 4. If the test statistics obey the IWN condition, then any BHq-compliant pro-
cedure satisfies
FDRk ≤
(
1 +
2√
qk
)
q.
for any k ≥ 1.
A number of remarks are as follows. This theorem allows us to take k = 1, thus giving
a bound on the usual FDR:
FDR ≤ q + 2√q.
Such a bound is not available in Theorem 1. For k ≥ 2, the bound here is larger than
that in Theorem 1, namely 2/
√
qk ≥ Ck − 1, due to the optimality of Ck and the fact
FDRk ≥ FDRk. The following proof actually establishes a stronger bound, pi0q+2
√
pi0q/k,
on the FDRk. Recall that pi0 is the true null proportion m0/m.
Proof of Theorem 4. Due to the compliance condition, the number of false discoveries
satisfies
V ≤ #
{
i is true null : pi ≤ qR
m
}
.
Thus, we get upper bound on FDP that takes the following form:
FDP ≤ max
R≤j≤m
#{i is true null : pi ≤ qj/m}
j
.
Consequently, we get
FDPk ≤ max
k≤j≤m
#{i is true null : pi ≤ qj/m}
j
. (3.7)
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Similar to what has been argued in Section 3.1, the inequality (3.7) still holds if all true
null p-values are replaced by m0 i. i. d. uniform variables U1, . . . , Um0 on (0, 1). This
observation shows that it suffices to prove
E
[
max
k≤j≤m
#
{
1 ≤ i ≤ m0 : Ui ≤ qj/m
}
j
]
≤
(
1 + 2/
√
qk
)
q. (3.8)
To show (3.8), denote by Vj = #{1 ≤ i ≤ m0 : Ui ≤ qj/m} and Yj = Vj/j. Conditional
on Yj+1, for every i ∈ {1 ≤ i ≤ m0 : Ui ≤ q(j+1)/m} the random variable Ui is uniformly
distributed on [0, q(j + 1)/m]. Hence, the conditional expectation of Vj given Yj+1 is
E(Vj |Yj+1) =
Vj+1
qj
m
q(j+1)
m
=
jVj+1
j + 1
,
which is equivalent to
E(Yj |Yj+1) = Yj+1 .
In words, Yj is a backward martingale and, as a consequence, (Yj−qm0/m)+ is a backward
submartingale. This fact allows us to apply Doob’s `2 martingale maximal inequality to
(Yj − qm0/m)+, yielding
E
[
max
k≤j≤m
(
Yj − qm0
m
)2
+
]
≤
(
2
2− 1
)2
E
(
Yk − qm0
m
)2
+
≤ 4E
(
Yk − qm0
m
)2
=
4qm0(1− qk/m)
km
<
4pi0q
k
.
Using Jensen’s inequality, the left-hand side of (3.8) satisfies
E
[
max
k≤j≤m
Yj
]
≤ qm0
m
+ E
[
max
k≤j≤m
(
Yj − qm0
m
)
+
]
≤ pi0q +
√
E
[
max
k≤j≤m
(
Yj − qm0
m
)2
+
]
≤ pi0q + 2
√
pi0q
k
.
4 FDR Control and Power of PrivateBHq
As an application of Theorem 1, this section considers FDR control and power of Pri-
vateBHq, proving the informally stated claims (b) and (c) from Section 1.3. Throughout
21
this process, we assume that the assumptions of Theorem 3 are adopted. In particular,
given the p-value functions p1, . . . , m we have chosen η, ν so that all pi are (η, ν)-sensitive.
As such, PrivateBHq preserves (ε, δ)-differential privacy, and for brevity this fact will not
be reiterated in this section.
The proposition below demonstrates that the PrivateBHq is indeed compliant by mak-
ing the cutoffs {γj} in Algorithm 5 slightly more stringent than the logarithms of the BHq
critical values.
Proposition 4.1. For any 0 < q < 1, use the cutoffs
γj = log
qj
m
− η
√
10m′ log(1/δ) log(6m′/q)
ε
(4.1)
for j = 1, . . . ,m′ in PrivateBHq. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3, this procedure is
compliant with the BHq critical values qj/m with probability at least 1− 0.1q.
The compliance condition shown in Proposition 4.1 together with Theorem 1 implies
FDR control of PrivateBHq. More precisely, letting C denote the event that the rejected
p-values are compliant, we have
FDRk = E (FDPk; C) + E
(
FDPk; C
)
≤ Ckq + P(C)
≤ (Ck + 0.1)q
for every k ≥ 2. This proves the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Under the same assumptions as in Proposition 4.1 and if the test statistics
satisfy the IWN condition, the PrivateBHq procedure gives
FDRk ≤ (Ck + 0.1)q
for all k ≥ 2.
To prove Proposition 4.1, we first present a simple lemma that gives a concentration
bound on Laplace random variables, and its proof can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 4.2. Let Z1, . . . , Zn be i. i. d. Lap(λ) random variables. For any 0 < α < 1, the
following two statements are true:
1. With probability at least 1− α, all Zj are larger than −λ log n2α .
2. With probability at least 1− α, all |Zj | are smaller than λ log nα .
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Let p˜iij = log max{ν, pij} + Zij be yielded by peeling in Algo-
rithm 5, where Zij follows Lap(λ) for j = 1, . . . ,m
′. The parameter λ = η
√
10m′ log(1/δ)/ε
is as in Theorem 3. Taking α = 0.1q, Lemma 4.2 shows that
Zij > −λ log
m′
2× 0.1q > −
η
√
10m′ log(1/δ) log(6m′/q)
ε
. (4.2)
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uniformly for j = 1, . . . ,m′ with probability at least 1− 0.1q.
Next, we show that on the event (4.2), PrivateBHq is compliant. Denote by RPt the
number of rejections made by this procedure. If p˜iij is rejected, it must satisfy
log max{ν, pij}+ Zij ≤ γRPt = log
qRPt
m
− η
√
10m′ log(1/δ) log(6m′/q)
ε
.
Plugging (4.2) into this display gives
log max{ν, pij} ≤ log
qRPt
m
.
Thus, pij ≤ qRPt/m for all rejected pij on the event (4.2), which happens with probability
at least 1− 0.1q. This completes the proof.
Next, Theorem 6 shows that the PrivateBHq procedure with a slightly inflated nominal
level is at least as powerful as the BHq step-down procedure. The proofs of this theorem
and its corollary are deferred to the appendix. To state the theorem, let RSD denote the
number of rejections made by the (non-private) step-down procedure.
Theorem 6. Fix q and assume ν ≤ q/m. Under the assumptions of Theorem 5, run the
PrivateBHq procedure at level
q′ = qe
24η
√
m′ log(1/δ) logm
ε
and the BHq step-down procedure at level q. Then, the numbers of rejections satisfy
RPt ≥ min{RSD,m′} (4.3)
with probability tending to one as m→∞.
If RSD ≥ m′ and the event (4.3) happens, PrivateBHq must reject all p-values passing
through peeling. This high-power property, however, is appealing if q′ is only slightly
larger than q or, put more simply, 24η
√
m′ log(1/δ) logm/ε is small. This is indeed the
case as shown by the corollary below.
Corollary 4.3. In Examples 2.6 and 2.7, fix ε, δ and assume m′ ≤ min{n1−c,m} for
constant c > 0. Under the assumptions of Theorem 6, the claims of both Theorems 5 and
6 hold as m,n → ∞ if PrivateBHq is performed at level (1 + c′)q for a sufficiently small
constant c′ > 0.
5 BHq under Negative Dependence
This section features three simulated examples with certain negative dependence between
the true null and false null test statistics. The simulation results empirically show that the
BHq step-up procedure controls FDR2 and FDR5, and this is consistent with Theorem 1.
Throughout, N0 with cardinality m0 and N1 with cardinality m1 ≡ m −m0 denote the
set of true null hypotheses and the set of false null hypotheses, respectively.
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Figure 2: FDRk of the BHq for k = 1, 2, 5 in Example 5.1, with level q = 0.1. The FDR1
is just the usual FDR. We set m to 1000, vary m1 from 50 to 500, and let µi = 2 for
1 ≤ i ≤ m1 and µi = 0 otherwise. The covariance matrix Σ has ones on the diagonal;
Σij = Σji = −1/√m0m1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m1 and m1 + 1 ≤ j ≤ m; all the rest entries
are zero. The results are averaged over 100 replicates. The upper and lower dashed lines
denote the bounds C2pi0q and C5pi0q, respectively.
Example 5.1 (Multivariate Normal). Consider observing X ∼ N (µ,Σ). The covariance
Σ is constructed as follows: Σii = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, Σij = 0 if i 6= j and both i, j ∈ N0
or i, j ∈ N1, and Σij = −1/√m0m1 if one of i, j belongs to N0 and the other belongs to
N1 (if this value is set to be smaller than −1/√m0m1, the covariance Σ is not positive
semidefinite). The distribution of X satisfies the IWN condition and, therefore, Theorem
1 guarantees FDR control of the BHq procedure used to test µi = 0 against the one-sided
alternative µi > 0. In contrast, the results of [10] are not applicable because the PRDS
property does not hold due to −1/√m0m1 < 0. Furthermore, Theorem 1 is still valid for
testing against the two-sided alternatives µi 6= 0. In general, the PRDS property is not
satisfied for two-sided tests (see discussion in Section 3.1 of [10]).
Figure 2 presents the empirical FDR,FDR2, and FDR5 of the BHq procedure for both
one-sided and two-sided alternatives in this example and, in addition, the bound Ckpi0q
in Theorem 1 for k = 2, 5 in dashed lines. As predicted by Theorem 1, the empirical
FDR2 and FDR5 are indeed below their corresponding dashed lines, and moreover, these
empirical error rates decrease eventually as the number of true effects m1 increases, which
reflects the presence of the true null proportion pi0 in the bound Ckpi0q. Notably, this
bound can be smaller than the nominal level q if m1 is sufficiently large.
Example 5.2 (Multivariate t-Distribution with Different Denominators). Consider ob-
serving i. i. d. vectors X(1), . . . , X(n) from N (µ,Σ), where both µ and Σ are the same as
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the previous example. To test µi = 0 against µi > 0 or µi 6= 0, we use the t-test statistics
ti =
√
nX¯i√
1
n−1
∑n
l=1(X
(l)
i − X¯i)2
,
where X¯i = (X
(1)
i + · · ·+X(n)i )/n for i = 1, . . . ,m. As earlier, Theorem 1 applies to this
example, as opposed to the the existing FDR literature, which fails to ensure FDR control
of the BHq procedure in this example.
Numerical results for Example 5.2 are displayed in Figure 3. The setup follows follows
Example 5.1, with n being set to 10. While the behavior the BHq procedure in Figure 2
basically remains the same in the present plot, we wish to point out that the effect of the
true null proportion pi0 is more pronounced in the present simulation study and the three
error rates coincide exactly once m1 exceeds 100 as the BHq in this setting always rejects
a substantial number of true nulls. The later shows the difference between the FDR and
FDRk is inconsequential in this example.
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(b) two-sided tests
Figure 3: FDRk of the BHq for k = 1, 2, 5 in Example 5.2, with level q = 0.1. The
experimental setup is the same as Figure 2. The parameter n is set to 10.
Example 5.3 (Multivariate Normal with Block-Diagonal Covariance). Consider bivariate
normal variables Xi, X˜i with means µi = 0 and µ˜i 6= 0, respectively, for i = 1, . . . ,m. Let
VarXi = Var X˜i = 1 for all i and the m pairs (Xi, X˜i) be jointly independent. Thus,
the 2m normal variables exhibit a diagonal-block covariance matrix that is formed by
m 2 × 2 blocks on the diagonal. The correlation corr(Xi, X˜i) within every block varies
from −1 to −0.1. Note that there are m true nulls among the 2m hypotheses and,
therefore, pi0 = 0.5. The IWN condition is satisfied because all true nulls are located
in different blocks. Consequently, the BHq procedure maintains FDRk control in this
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example by applying Theorem 1, as opposed to existing results in the literature, which to
our knowledge are not capable of confirming the FDR control for this example. Moreover,
the usual FDR control follows from Theorem 1 as a corollary, whose proof can be found
in the appendix. As an appealing feature of this result, the dependence within each block
can be arbitrary and even be different across blocks.
Corollary 5.4. Fix 0 < q < 1. Assume that
{1 ≤ i ≤ m : µ˜i ≥ c1}/m ≥ c2
for positive constants c1, c2 in Example 5.3. For both one-sided and two-sided alternatives,
the BHq procedure controls the usual FDR in an asymptotic sense. That is, as m→∞,
FDR ≤ (1 + om(1))q.
The numerical results are summarized in Figure 4. Note that the three FDR vari-
ants coincide through the range of within-block correlations. Interestingly, the bound
corresponding to k = 5 (the lower dashed line) is below the nominal level q = 0.1.
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Figure 4: FDRk of the BHq for k = 1, 2, 5 in Example 5.3, with level q = 0.1. Here, m
is set to 5000, µ˜i is set to 1.5 for all i. Note that the true null proportion pi0 = 0.5. All
points represent the average of 100 independent runs. The correlation between Xi and X˜i
is set to be the same across all i, varying from −1 to −0.1.
6 Discussion
This paper has developed a privacy-preserving multiple testing procedure termed Pri-
vateBHq for FDR control. On the privacy side, we propose a new notion of sensitivity
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tailored to p-values and recognize the sequential nature of the BHq (step-down) procedure
so as to keep PrivateBHq efficient under the differential privacy constraint. Differential
privacy of this whole pipeline follows from the composition nature of differential privacy.
On the statistical side, as a major contribution of the paper, it is proved that a large
class of multiple testing procedures, including the step-up, step-down, and PrivateBHq
procedures, control the FDRk only provided the joint independence of the true null test
statistics. A novel aspect of this result lies in the absence of any assumption on the
dependence between the true nulls and false nulls.
Looking forward, our work raises a number of open questions. First, it would be
interesting to take into account prior knowledge, such as the importance of hypotheses and
beliefs about which are true nulls, into the design of a differentially private procedure. In
addition, recent years have seen a flurry of exciting activities in designing multiple testing
procedures that incorporate data structures, including streaming hypothesis testing [37],
group structures [5, 14, 44], and linear regression [13, 4]. Arguably, privacy concerns arise
from applying these new procedures and thus their private versions would be appreciated.
Moreover, it is natural to wonder if the bound in Theorem 1 can improve by imposing some
structure on the dependence between the true null and false null test statistics. Last, it
would be interesting to consider other notions of privacy such as concentrated differential
privacy [26].
Finally, we wish to make a connection to a remarkable property of differential privacy:
it protects against false discoveries due to adaptive data analysis, where an analysis is
informed by prior interactions with the same database [20, 19, 6]. Adaptivity is ubiquitous
in practice as the analyst is often not clear a priori what are the right questions to ask
about a database. In the multiple testing context, this issue arises when hypotheses are
adaptively selected based on prior discoveries. A question of great interest is to develop a
multiple testing procedure that remains to preserve privacy in the presence of adaptivity.
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A Proofs
This section proves all results made without proof in the main text. Below, the proofs are
listed in order of appearance of their corresponding results.
Proof of Lemma 2.4. For an arbitrary index 1 ≤ j ≤ m and a measurable set S ⊂ R, it
suffices to prove that
P(f˜j is the smallest and fj(D) + Z ∈ S)
P(f˜ ′j is the smallest and fj(D′) + Z ∈ S)
≤ eε,
where f˜ ′j is the counterpart of f˜j evaluated on an adjacent database D
′. This inequality
is equivalent to
P(f˜j is smallest)P(fj(D) + Z ∈ S|f˜j is smallest)
P(f˜ ′j is smallest)P(fj(D′) + Z ∈ S|f˜ ′j is smallest)
≤ eε. (A.1)
First, releasing the index of the smallest noisy count is (ε/2, 0)-differentially private, which
has been proven by Claim 3.9 in Section 3.3 of [24]. That is,
P(f˜j is smallest)
P(f˜ ′j is smallest)
≤ eε/2.
Second, observe that by assumption |fj(D)− fj(D′)| ≤ ∆. Then Lemma 2.3 shows that
P(fj(D) + Z ∈ S|f˜j is smallest)
P(fj(D′) + Z ∈ S|f˜ ′j is smallest)
≤ eε/2.
Combining the last two displays concludes that (A.1) is bounded by eε. This finishes the
proof.
31
Proof of Example 2.6. We use t−1 in place of t. Under the constraint that p(D), p(D′) ≥
ν, we aim to prove that (
n
t−1
)∑n
i=t
(
n
i
) ≤ η
if η √(log n)/n. Without loss of generality, assume t ≥ n/2, where a well-known result
is
n∑
i=t
1
2n
(
n
i
)
≤ e−nKL( tn , 12 ). (A.2)
Above, the Kullback–Leibler divergence is defined as
KL(a, b) = a log
a
b
+ (1− a) log 1− a
1− b .
It is easy to show that
KL
(
a,
1
2
)
≥ 2
(
a− 1
2
)2
.
Therefore, plugging
n∑
i=t
1
2n
(
n
i
)
≥ ν = m−1−c = 1
poly(n)
into (A.2), we get
t
n
≤ 1
2
+O
(√
log n
n
)
or, put differently,
t ≤ n
2
+O
(√
n log n
)
.
Therefore, we can assume t ≤ 7n/8. Provided that n/2 ≤ t ≤ 7n/8, we can apply Little-
wood’s theorem [43, 46]. Letting u = (2t− n)/√n, ρ = 1− t/n and Ξ(x) = Φ(−x)/φ(x),
where Φ(x) and φ(x) are the cumulative distribution function and density function of
N (0, 1) respectively, this theorem gives
n∑
i=t
1
2n
(
n
i
)
= (1 +O(1/n)) Φ(−u)eA1+A2/
√
ρ(1−ρ)n,
where
A1 =
u2
2
−
(
t− 1
2
)
log
2t
n
−
(
n− t+ 1
2
)
log
2(n− t)
n
and
A2 =
1− 2ρ
6
[
1− u2
Ξ(u)
+ u3
]
+
1/Ξ(u)− u
2
.
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Because t ≤ n/2 +O(√n log n) as n→∞, we have u = O(√log n), ρ = 12 − o(1). Making
use of the fact that Ξ(u) = (1 + o(1))/u, we see that
n∑
i=t
1
2n
(
n
i
)
= (1 +O(1/n)) Φ(−u)eA1(1 + o(1))
= (1 + o(1))
Φ(−u)√
2piφ(u)
e−(t−
1
2
) log 2t
n
−(n−t+ 1
2
) log
2(n−t)
n
= (1 + o(1))
Φ(−u)√
2piφ(u)
e−t log
2t
n
−(n−t) log 2(n−t)
n
= (1 + o(1))
Φ(−u)√
2piφ(u)
e−nKL(
t
n
, 1
2
)
= (1 + o(1)) · (1 + o(1)) 1√
2piu
e−nKL(
t
n
, 1
2
)
≥ O(1)√
2pi log n
e−nKL(
t
n
, 1
2
).
(A.3)
Next, we consider
1
2n
(
n
t− 1
)
By Stirling’s formula and using the fact that t = (0.5 + o(1))n, we get
1
2n
(
n
t− 1
)
=
t
n+ 1− t
1
2n
(
n
t
)
= (1 + o(1))
1
2n
(
n
t
)
= (1 + o(1))
√
2
pin
· n
n
2ntt(n− t)n−t
= (1 + o(1))
√
2
pin
· e−nKL( tn , 12 )
Thus, we get
1
2n
(
n
t−1
)∑n
i=t
1
2n
(
n
i
) ≤ O(1)(1 + o(1))
√
2
pin · e−nKL(
t
n
, 1
2
)
1√
2pi logn
e−nKL(
t
n
, 1
2
)
= O
(√
log n
n
)
.
Thus, with ν = m−1−c, we can choose η 
√
logn
n .
Proof of Example 2.7. Let ζ, ζ1, . . . , ζn be i. i. d. exponential variable with λ = 1 truncated
at A. Consider the cumulant generating function
κ(θ) = logE eθζ .
33
As in the proof of Example 2.6, it does not lose generality by assuming t > nE ζ. Write
a = t/n > E ζ and let θa be the root of the saddle-point equation
κ′(θa) = a. (A.4)
In particular, Eθa ζ = a. Note that under Eθ the density of ζ is
λe−λx
1− e−Aλ e
θx−κ(θ) · 1(0 ≤ x ≤ A).
Through exponential tilting, we get
P(T ≥ na) = P (ζ1 + · · ·+ ζn ≥ na)
= e−n(aθa−κ(θa)) Eθa e−θa(T−na)1(T ≥ na).
Using saddle point approximation, we get
Eθa e−θa(T−na)1(T ≥ na) =
1 + o(1)√
2piκ′′(θa)nθa
Thus, we have
P(T ≥ na) = (1 + o(1)) e
−n(aθa−κ(θa))√
2piκ′′(θa)nθa
. (A.5)
Next, we evaluate κ′′(θa) and θa. Denote by µ and σ2 the mean and variance of ζ,
respectively. We get θa = o(1) and κ
′′(θa) = Varθa(ζ) = σ2 + o(1). In particular, from
(A.4) we get
θa = (1 + o(1))
a− µ
σ2
,
which gives
aθa − κ(θa) = (1 + o(1))(a− µ)
2
2σ2
.
Plugging this display into
e−n(aθa−κ(θa)) ≥ ν = m−1−c = 1
poly(n)
.
gives
t = nµ+O(
√
n log n).
Therefore, we get
Eθa e−θa(T−na)1(T ≥ na) =
1 + o(1)√
2piκ′′(θa)nθa
=
O(1)√
log n
,
which together with (A.5) yields
P (T ≥ na) = e
−n(aθa−κ(θa))
√
log n
. (A.6)
34
To evaluate the ratio
P (na−A ≤ T < na)
P (T ≥ na) ,
it remains to approximate P (na−A ≤ T < na). We use the local central limit theorem
to do this. Explicitly, using the local central limit theorem, we get
P (t−A ≤ T < t) = e−n(aθa−κ(θa)) Eθa e−θa(T−na)1(na−A ≤ T < na)
≤ e−n(aθa−κ(θa)) Eθa eθaA1(na−A ≤ T < na)
= eθaAe−n(aθa−κ(θa)) Pθa(na−A ≤ T < na)
= eθaAe−n(aθa−κ(θa))
(
A√
2pinσa
+ o(1/
√
n)
)
= (1 + o(1))
AeθaAe−n(aθa−κ(θa))√
2pinσa
,
(A.7)
where σa is the standard deviation of ζ tilted at θa. That is, σa =
√
Varθa ζ = σ + o(1).
Finally, combing (A.6) and (A.7) gives
P (na−A ≤ T < na)
P (T ≥ na) ≤ O(1)
√
log n
n
.
As such, we can choose
η = O(1)
√
log n
n
.
An example of p-value computation from [60]. The authors in [60] focus on privacy-preserving
release of χ2-statistics computed from contingency tables. Below, we show that the p-value
derived from the χ2-statistic is not (η, ν)-sensitive with some η, ν → 0 even if n→∞. For
the sake of simplicity, here we consider 2 × 2 contingency tables with n/2 cases and n/2
controls.
Case Control
Exposed a a
Unexposed n2 − a n2 − a
Case Control
Exposed a+ 1 a
Unexposed n2 − a− 1 n2 − a
Table 1: Two neighboring contingency tables.
In particular, we focus on two adjacent tables as shown in Table 1. The χ2-statistic of
the left table is
χ2L = 0
because a× (n/2−a)−a× (n/2−a) = 0 and, as a consequence, the corresponding p-value
is
pL ≈ P(χ21 ≥ χ2L) = 1.
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Next, for the right table the statistic equals
χ2R =
[(a+ 1)(n/2− a)− a(n/2− a− 1)]2
n
×
[
1
n
2 (2a+ 1)
+
1
n
2 (2a+ 1)
+
1
n
2 (n− 2a− 1)
+
1
n
2 (n− 2a− 1)
]
=
n
4
×
[
1
n
2 (2a+ 1)
+
1
n
2 (2a+ 1)
+
1
n
2 (n− 2a− 1)
+
1
n
2 (n− 2a− 1)
]
=
1
2
[
1
2a+ 1
+
1
2a+ 1
+
1
n− 2a− 1 +
1
n− 2a− 1
]
=
1
2a+ 1
+
1
n− 2a− 1 .
Now, assuming 5 ≤ a n, we get
χ2R =
1
2a+ 1
+ o(1),
leading to
pR ≈ P(χ21 ≥ χ2R) ≈ 2Φ
(
− 1√
2a+ 1
)
.
Thus, in this example both pR and pL are bounded below away from 0 and the ratio
2Φ
(
− 1√
2a+1
)
does not tend to 1 as n→∞. As a consequence of this, it is impossible to
have both vanishing η and ν for this p-value computation.
Proof of Theorem 3. The PrivateBHq procedure acts on the intermediate results
(i1, p˜ii1), . . . , (ik, p˜iik)
provided by the peeling. Hence, Lemma 2.8 implies that it suffices to establish the (ε, δ)-
differential privacy for peeling as a part of PrivateBHq. By Lemma 2.4, each Private
Min in peeling is ( 2ε√
10k log(1/δ)
, 0)-differentially private. Then Lemma 2.9 immediately
asserts that peeling preserves (ε˜, δ)-differential privacy, where
ε˜ =
2ε√
10k log(1/δ)
√
2k log(1/δ) + k
2ε√
10k log(1/δ)
(e
2ε√
10k log(1/δ) − 1)
=
2ε√
5
+
2ε
√
k√
10 log(1/δ)
(e
2ε√
10k log(1/δ) − 1).
(A.8)
Recognizing that 2ε√
10k log(1/δ)
≤ 0.0659 under the assumptions ε ≤ 0.5, δ ≤ 0.1 and k ≥ 10,
we get
2ε
√
k√
10 log(1/δ)
[
e
2ε√
10k log(1/δ) − 1
]
≤ 2ε
√
k√
10 log(1/δ)
× 1.034× 2ε√
10k log(1/δ)
≤ 0.0899ε.
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Substituting this line into (A.8) yields ε˜ ≤ 2ε/√5 + 0.0899ε ≤ ε, as desired.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. The proof is similar to that of Example 5.6.1 in [18]. By scaling,
assume that ξi are exponential random variables with parameter 1, i.e, E ξi = 1. Note
that Wj is measurable with respect to Fj . In the proof, we first consider the conditional
expectation E(W−1j |Fj+1), then return to E(Wj |Fj+1) by applying Jensen’s inequality.
Specifically, we have
E
[
ξl
jTm+1
∣∣Fj+1] = 1
jTm+1
E(ξl|Fj+1)
because Tm+1 is measurable in Fj+1. Next, observe that by symmetry we get
E(ξl|Fj+1) = E(ξk|Fj+1)
for any l, k ≤ j + 1. Combining the last two displays gives
E
[
Tj
jTm+1
∣∣Fj+1] = E [ Tj
(j + 1)Tm+1
∣∣Fj+1]+ j∑
l=1
E
[
ξl
j(j + 1)Tm+1
∣∣Fj+1]
= E
[
Tj
(j + 1)Tm+1
∣∣Fj+1]+ j∑
l=1
E
[
ξj+1
j(j + 1)Tm+1
∣∣Fj+1]
= E
[
Tj+1
(j + 1)Tm+1
∣∣Fj+1]
=
Tj+1
(j + 1)Tm+1
.
To complete the proof, note that Jensen’s inequality asserts that
E(Wj |Fj+1) ≥ 1E(W−1j |Fj+1)
=
(j + 1)Tm+1
Tj+1
= Wj+1 ,
as desired.
Proof of Theorem 2. In addition to the sketch proof in Section 3.2, it remains to show
that
1
q
E
[
j?
j? + max{dmU(j?)/qe − j?, 0}
]
→ Ck
as q → 0,m→∞,m−m0 →∞ and m0/m→ 1. Since j? = OP(1) and mU(j?) is bounded
below away from 0 as m0 →∞ and m0/m→ 1, one can show that2
max{dmU(j?)/qe − j?, 0} = mU(j?)/q − j? +OP(1).
2One needs to ensure that m−m0 is larger than max{dmU(j?)/qe− j?, 0} with high probability. Thus,
q should tend to 0 slowly as m−m0 →∞.
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Thus, we get
1
q
· j
?
j? + max{dmU(j?)/qe − j?, 0}
=
j?
mU(j?)
+ oP(1)
= max
k≤j≤m0
j
mU(j)
+ oP(1).
By assumption, we have
E
[
max
k≤j≤m0
j
mU(j)
]
= (1 + o(1))E
[
max
k≤j≤m0
j
m0U(j)
]
→ Ck
as m0 →∞.
To complete the proof, the last step is to show that
1
q
· j
?
j? + max{dmU(j?)/qe − j?, 0}
is bounded by an integrable random variable. To this end, we note that if mU(j?)/q ≥ j?,
then
1
q
· j
?
j? + max{dmU(j?)/qe − j?, 0}
≤ j
?
mU(j?)
,
and otherwise q ≥ mU(j?)/j?, yielding
1
q
· j
?
j? + max{dmU(j?)/qe − j?, 0}
≤ 1
q
· j
?
j? + 0
≤ j
?
mU(j?)
.
Note that j
?
mU(j?)
is bounded by an integrable random variable by resorting the represen-
tation using Tj .
Proof of Lemma 3.6. We first prove the case where k ≥ 3. The uniform integrability
follows if we show
sup
n≥k
E
(
max
k≤j≤n
jTn+1
nTj
)2
<∞. (A.9)
As proved by Lemma 3.2, jTn+1nTj is a backward submartingale for j = k, k+1, . . . , n. Thus,
by Doob’s maximal inequality, we get
E
(
max
k≤j≤n
jTn+1
nTj
)2
≤ 4E
(
kTn+1
nTk
)2
So, the proof would be completed if we verify
sup
n≥k
E
(
kTn+1
nTk
)2
<∞.
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To this end, note that
E
k2T 2n+1
n2T 2k
=
k2
n2
E
(Tk + Tn+1 − Tk)2
T 2k
=
k2
n2
E
T 2k + 2Tk(n+ 1− k) + (n+ 1− k)2 + (n+ 1− k)
T 2k
≤ k
2
n2
E
T 2k + 2nTk + n
2
T 2k
≤ k
2
n2
+
2k2
n
E
1
Tk
+ k2 E
1
T 2k
≤ 1 + 2kE 1
Tk
+ k2 E
1
T 2k
,
which is finite if k ≥ 3. Thus, (A.9) holds for k ≥ 3.
Next, we turn to the case of k = 2. Recognize that
max
2≤j≤n
jTn+1
nTj
≤ 2Tn+1
nT2
+ max
3≤j≤n
jTn+1
nTj
=
2
n
+
2(Tn+1 − T2)
nT2
+ max
3≤j≤n
jTn+1
nTj
Since 2n and max3≤j≤n
jTn+1
nTj
are both uniformly integrable, it is sufficiently to show the
uniform integrability of 2(Tn+1−T2)nT2 for n ≥ 2. To this end, note that
E
[
2(Tn+1 − T2)
nT2
]1.5
=
21.5
n1.5
E(Tn+1 − T2)1.5 ET−1.52
≤ 2
1.5
n1.5
[
E(Tn+1 − T2)2
] 3
4 ET−1.52
=
21.5
n1.5
[
(n− 1)2 + n− 1] 34 ET−1.52
< 21.5 ET−1.52 ,
which is finite. The proof is complete.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. We first consider part one. Note that
P
(
Zj ≤ −λ log n
2α
)
=
1
2
× 2α
n
=
α
n
. (A.10)
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Hence, taking a union bound, we get
P
(
all Zj > −λ log n
2α
)
= 1− P
(
minZj ≤ −λ log n
2α
)
≥ 1−
n∑
j=1
P
(
Zj ≤ −λ log n
2α
)
= 1− nα
n
= 1− α.
The proof of part two is the follows the same reasoning except using
P
(
|Zj | ≥ λ log n
α
)
=
α
n
in place of (A.10).
Proof of Theorem 6. In the proof below, we replace the assumption on the nominal level
with the relaxed assumption that q ≥ 6m−1.5. Let 0 < α,α′ < 1 be specified later.
Denote by R′SD = min{RSD,m′} and let pj1 , . . . , pjR′
SD
be the R′SD smallest p-values. By
the construction of the step-down procedure, we get
max{pj1 , . . . , pjR′
SD
} ≤ qR
′
SD
m
.
First, we point out that the first R′SD selections (without added noise) in the peeling stage
of PrivateBHq, denoted as pii1 , . . . , piiR′
SD
, obey
max{pii1 , . . . , piiR′
SD
} ≤ log qR
′
SD
m
+ 2λ log
m2
α
(A.11)
with probability at least 1− α. To show this, we recognize that, with probability at least
1− α, all the mm′ noise terms added by PrivateBHq are bounded in absolute value by
λ log
mm′
α
≤ λ log m
2
α
(A.12)
by using Lemma 4.2. Now, consider the lthe step of invoking the peeling, where 1 ≤ l ≤
R′SD. Note that at least one of pij1 , . . . , pijR′
SD
remains on the list. Hence, at least one
candidate for Report Noisy Min is no greater than
log max
{
qR′SD
m
, ν
}
+ λ log
m2
α
= log
qR′SD
m
+ λ log
m2
α
.
Then, it must hold that
piil + Z
′
il
≤ log qR
′
SD
m
+ λ log
m2
α
,
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where on the event (A.12) Z ′il ≥ −λ log m
2
α . Therefore, we get
piil ≤ log
qR′SD
m
+ 2λ log
m2
α
,
thus confirming (A.11).
With added noise, the counts satisfy
p˜iil ≤ log
qR′SD
m
+ 2λ log
m2
α
+ λ log
m′
2α′
≤ − log m
qR′SD
+ 2λ log
m2
α
+ λ log
m
2α′
(A.13)
with probability at least 1− α− α′ for all l = 1, . . . , R′SD. Next, take
2λ log
m2
α
+ λ log
m
2α′
≤ 16η
√
k log(1/δ) logm
ε
(A.14)
as given for the moment. Then, from (A.13) we get
p˜iil ≤ − log
m
qR′SD
+
16η
√
k log(1/δ) logm
ε
(A.15)
for all i = 1, . . . , R′SD with probability at least 1− α− α′. Now, we turn to verify (A.14),
which is equivalent to
2 log
m2
α
+ log
m
2α′
≤ 16√
10
logm.
To this end, it suffices to set α = m−0.014 and α′ = m−0.029/2. Since both α, α′ → 0 as
m→∞, we see that (A.15) holds with probability tending to one.
Recognizing (A.15), to reject all of these R′SD hypotheses using PrivateBHq, it is
sufficient to have
− log m
qR′SD
+
16η
√
k log(1/δ) logm
ε
≤ − log m
q′R′SD
−
η
√
10k log 1δ log
6m′
q′
ε
,
which is equivalent to
log
q′
q
≥
η
√
10k log 1δ log
6m′
q′
ε
+
16η
√
k log(1/δ) logm
ε
=
η
√
k log(1/δ)
ε
[√
10 log
6m′
q′
+ 16 logm
]
.
(A.16)
Since q ≥ 6m−1.5, we get
√
10 log
6m′
q′
≤
√
10 log
6m
q
≤
√
10 log
6m
6m−1.5
< 8 logm.
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Hence, (A.16) is implied by
log
q′
q
≥ 24η
√
k log(1/δ) logm
ε
,
which is in fact an equality by assumption. Thus, the proof is complete.
Proof of Corollary 4.3. A careful look at the proof of Theorem 5 reveals that the event in
Proposition 4.1 holds with probability at least 1− q/12. As such, the bound on the FDRk
in Theorem 5 can be strengthened to (Ck + 1/12)q.
In light of the above, we set c′ such that
(Ck + 1/12)(1 + c
′) = Ck + 0.1.
Then, PrivateBHq at level (1 + c′)q controls the FDRk at level (Ck + 0.1)q as ensured by
Theorem 5.
It remains to prove that the claim of Theorem 6 also holds. To this end, we only
need to show that q′ that is given in the statement of Theorem 6 is less than (1 + c′)q for
sufficiently large m,n. That is,
(1 + c′)q > q′ ≡ qe 24η
√
m′ log(1/δ) logm
ε .
In both examples, η = n−0.5+o(1) and logm = log poly(n) = no(1). Thus, we have
e
24η
√
m′ log(1/δ) logm
ε → 0
due to m′ ≤ n1−c. Therefore, in words, PrivateBHq at level (1 + c′)q should be at least as
powerful as the truncated BHq step-down procedure with probability tending to one.
Proof of Corollary 5.4. The proof idea is to apply Theorem 1 or Corollary 1.3 and recog-
nize the number of rejections R in Example 5.3 tends to infinity. We only consider the case
of one-sided alternatives and the proof of the two-sided alternatives case is very similar.
Assume for the moment that R → ∞ with probability tending to one as m → ∞.
Then, we have
|FDP− FDPk| = V 1V <k
max{R, 1}
≤ k − 1
max{R, 1}
= oP(1).
Thus, from Theorem 1, we get
FDR = FDRk + om(1)
≤ Ckpi0q + om(1)
≤ Ckq + om(1).
(A.17)
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Letting k →∞, one gets Ck → 1. Thus, from (A.17) it follows that
FDR ≤ q + om(1).
Now, we aim to complete the proof by showing R → ∞ in probability. In fact, it
will be shown that P(R ≥ b√me) → 1. By the construction of the step-up procedure,
R ≥ b√mc if
#
{
i : Φ(−Xi) ≤ qb
√
mc
2m
}
+ #
{
i : Φ(−X˜i) ≤ qb
√
mc
2m
}
≥ b√mc,
which is implied by
#
{
i : Φ(−X˜i) ≤ qb
√
mc
2m
}
≥ b√mc. (A.18)
Now, we aim to show (A.18) holds with probability tending to one. Denote by A = {i :
µ˜i ≥ c1}, which, by assumption, satisfies #A ≥ c2m. Consider Wi := X˜i − µ˜i ∼ N (0, 1)
for i ∈ A and let W(1) ≥ · · · ≥ W(#A) be the order statistics. Note that (A.18) simply
follows from
Φ
(
−c1 −W(b√mc)
)
≤ qb
√
mc
2m
,
which is equivalent to
− c1 −W(b√mc) ≤ Φ−1
(
qb√mc
2m
)
. (A.19)
To prove (A.19), we make two observations:
Φ−1
(
qb√mc
2m
)
= −
√
2 log
2m
qb√mc + o(1) (A.20)
W(b√mc) =
√
2 log
#A
b√mc + oP(1) (A.21)
as both qb√mc/(2m) tends to zero and #A/b√mc diverges to infinity. Above, (A.20) is a
standard result and a proof of (A.21) can be found in Chapter 2 of [17]. Hence, it suffices
to show
−c1
2
−
√
2 log
c2m
b√mc ≤ −
√
2 log
2m
qb√mc
for sufficiently large m, which is true since√
2 log
c2m
b√mc −
√
2 log
2m
qb√mc =
√
logm+ 2 log c2 + o(1)−
√
logm+ 2 log(2/q) + o(1)
=
√
logm+ o(1)−
√
logm− o(1)
= o(1).
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